



***Understanding  
and Supporting  
Security Sector  
Reform***

# **Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform**

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# ACRONYMS

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BMATT	British Military Assistance Training Team
DFID	Department for International Development
DAT	Defence Advisory Team
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCASED	Programme for the Co-ordination of Assistance for Security and Development
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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# 1. Introduction

Security is an essential condition for sustainable development and a strong concern of the poor. The role of the state and its security forces directly impact upon the opportunities for sustainable development and peoples' physical security. There is a growing consensus that security needs to be approached just as much from the perspective of protecting individuals and communities from violence as from the degree to which defence spending crowds out development expenditure. To this end, it is important to understand the composition of the security sector as a whole, the roles and responsibilities of the various actors, and the relationships between them. Too often, the military is used to sustain governments in power and is inappropriately involved in internal security. Police forces are often under-funded and unable to guarantee security thus giving rise to coercion and corruption.

Security Sector Reform must account for the overall security context and address the fundamentals as well as the specifics. Effective management, transparency and accountability of the security sector is just as necessary as with any other part of the public sector. Resources need to be managed efficiently to allow the provision of security that does not threaten democracy or human rights, or undermine other development goals.

## 1.1 What do we mean by the Security Sector?

### Box 1.1: Security actors

#### **Core security actors**

armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).

#### **Security management and oversight bodies**

the Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit & planning units); and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

#### **Justice and law enforcement institutions**

judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.

#### **Non-statutory security forces**

liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political party militias.

In broad terms the security sector comprises all those responsible for protecting the state and communities within it (see Box 1.1). For the purposes of these guidelines we focus more narrowly on the military, paramilitary and intelligence services, and the civilian structures responsible for their oversight and control, but it is important to remember that these institutions are part of a broader picture, for example when looking at the boundaries between the military and the police, or military and civil courts.

*Security is vital for poor people...*

*...but is not guaranteed if the security sector is greedy and corrupt and involved in inappropriate activities...*

*...the security sector should be subject to the same governance norms as other parts of the public sector.*

*The sector has several components...*

*...but these Guidelines focus on the military and intelligence services...*



Separate guidance on assistance with policing and the civil justice system is available in:

*Safety, Security and Access to Justice for All: Putting Policy into Practice*  
(Governance Department, Department for International Development, 2002)

...particularly on the civil institutions responsible for managing them.

DFID does not provide direct assistance to the military, so the main focus of the guidance is on the related institutional machinery – the civil authorities responsible for managing the security sector, including the Executive, Legislative oversight bodies, the Judiciary, national security advisory bodies, defence and interior ministries, customary and traditional authorities, financial audit and planning units, and Human Rights Ombudsmen.

## 1.2 Objectives of the Guidelines

Their purpose is to provide practical guidance for DFID governance advisers and country programme managers considering how to support the security sector.

The guidelines may also be helpful to DFID personnel working on overlapping issues of governance, economic reform, social development, post-conflict reconstruction, and emergency response work; to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Home Office and the Ministry Of Defence (MOD) who are responsible for other parts of the agenda; and to other donors and our partners in developing and transition countries.

## 1.3 Why does the security sector matter to poor people?

Because security is central to effective and durable development. But it requires well-managed and competent personnel operating within an institutional framework defined by law. A badly managed security sector hampers development, discourages investment, and helps to perpetuate poverty.

To support effective development, the security sector needs to be well managed, competent and law abiding.

DEFECT	CONSEQUENCES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Government unable or unwilling to control the military and other security actors.</li> <li>&gt; Government unable or unwilling to control military expenditure and defence procurement.</li> <li>&gt; Governments enact repressive internal security measures for narrow political gain.</li> <li>&gt; Defence strategy based on unreal or inflated estimate of threats.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Coups d'état; democratic, accountable government unable to take root; human rights abuses; other abuses of power.</li> <li>&gt; Public money wasted on unnecessary and/or over-priced equipment; corruption.</li> <li>&gt; Excessive military expenditure; democracy under threat; human rights abuses.</li> <li>&gt; Excessive military expenditure; possible inability to deal with the wider threats to security</li> </ul>

DFID can help to improve the governance of the security sector...

## 1.4 How can DFID help?

DFID's primary role is to help with the governance agenda – the government, political and judicial framework for accountable management of national security; and the role of civil society. The MOD advises on defence management and is responsible for the provision of military education and training, and equipment. Other aspects of assistance to the sector

may require inputs from the FCO, the Home Office, and civilian security and intelligence agencies.

## 1.5 When not to offer assistance

Since the point of any DFID intervention is to reduce poverty, DFID should not intervene without being satisfied that what is proposed will contribute to the reduction of poverty. For example, while reduced military spending can make it possible to spend more on social services, this will not happen in practice unless there is political commitment, and effective institutional mechanisms to translate that commitment into action. In some cases, it may be necessary to increase security spending in the short term in order to create a climate conducive to sustainable development and the reduction of poverty.

Caution should be exercised where the military and other security and intelligence actors are entrenched in the economic, social and political fabric of the state, or where a civilian government relies on them to maintain power. In these circumstances assistance can offer regimes an international legitimacy that they do not enjoy domestically. Nevertheless, where opportunities exist to support concrete reforms these should be explored.

*... providing this will make a real contribution to reducing poverty.*

*Be wary if the military are over involved in extraneous activities...*

## 1.6 Structure of the guidelines

- Chapter 2 explains the involvement of other UK government departments and other donors.
- Chapter 3 deals with diagnosis.
- Chapter 4 considers how to design an intervention.
- Chapters 5 to 11 look in more detail at the seven main areas identified as likely focuses for reform.
- Annex 1 lists other departments and organisations concerned with security sector reform.
- Annex 2 contains a bibliography of references on security sector reform.

*...or are propping up a government which lacks adequate popular support.*

## 2. Working with UK and international partners

*A joined-up approach will usually mean liaison with FCO, MOD and Home Office...*

### 2.1 UK partners

Where a reform programme involves a package of activities, not all of which fall to DFID, wider consultation with the FCO, MOD, and Home Office, as well as the normal consultations within DFID, will clearly be necessary to ensure a “joined-up” and properly sequenced approach. But even where reform focuses narrowly on an area of concern to DFID, consultation with other departments may be advisable because of the need to consider the wider context.

#### Box 2.1: Joined-up programming in Sierra Leone

UK support for security sector reform in Sierra Leone has combined development, military, police, and diplomatic activities conducted by four Government departments. **DFID** has funded activities that come under the heading of civilian control of the security sector, including, with **MOD** help, the development of a national security policy, and the re-organisation of the defence ministry and the development of its management capacity. The **MOD** is helping to restructure and train the national army and to build its management capacity. The **Home Office** has provided personnel to help manage and reform the national police service. The **FCO** has provided funding for military education and training and is active in supporting efforts to consolidate Sierra Leone's peace process. These initiatives are coordinated through the Cabinet Office and are now funded mainly through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool.

*...the FCO sets the political framework...*

#### Who does what?

**The FCO** sets the political framework for the UK's engagement with countries requesting assistance, and can also provide:

- political support for peace agreements;
- assistance to promote respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights;
- support for efforts to strengthen conflict prevention and peacekeeping.

*...the MOD can provide direct help to the military...*

**MOD** support includes help with:

- education on the role of armed forces in democratic society;
- conduct of national defence reviews;
- development of defence policies;
- strengthening defence resource management;
- increasing accountability in defence procurement;
- strengthening military personnel management systems;
- training on human rights and democratic accountability.

Support is provided through Defence Advisers in embassies and High Commissions; the Defence Advisory Team (see box 2.2); British Military Advisory & Training Teams (see box 2.3) based in several regions overseas; and defence education and training institutions in the UK.

### Box 2.2: The role of the Defence Advisory Team (DAT)

The **DAT** consists of 10–15 personnel based in the UK. Its objectives are to provide a mobile team of civilian and military advisers to undertake short-term training and advisory work. DFID has seconded a governance adviser to be a permanent member. The **DAT** can provide support for the conduct of defence reviews, education on the democratic management of the security sector, and technical advice on strengthening defence resource management systems and procurement processes.

### Box 2.3: British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTS)

**BMATTS** can:

- provide military training;
- advise on reorganisation of the military;
- enhance armed forces' understanding of, and ability to take part in, UN and regional Peace Support Operations;
- promote understanding and respect for human rights, and accountability within the Ministries of Defence and armed forces;
- strengthen regional military co-operation and stability.

The **Home Office** is able to provide support for police reform targeted both at national police forces and military or police personnel that form part of peacekeeping missions.

In addition, there are a number of **academic institutions** and **independent groups** with specialist expertise on security issues, which play a key role in many UK security sector assistance activities. Their activities include research and analysis on security issues, advising Government departments on policy issues, and helping to implement programmes.

See Annex 1 for further details.

There will also be occasions when DFID will need to be consulted about assistance offered by other departments. For example, UK military assistance programmes that promote arms sales or transfers are of concern to DFID. DFID plays a strong role in assessing export licence applications where sustainable development is an issue. See Box 2.4

### Box 2.4: The Mauritius Mandate

The **Mauritius Mandate** commits Britain to restrict export credits for heavily indebted poor countries to productive expenditures. DFID is among those providing advice to the **Department for Trade and Industry** on export license applications for arms sales, to ensure that the developmental perspective is considered.

## 2.2 Other donors

In liaising with other donors it is important to bear in mind the sensitivities mentioned in section 3.2. These could be exacerbated if donors are seen to be discussing security issues among themselves, with no host country presence.

Policy coherence can be strengthened in a number of ways:

- formulating donor policy frameworks for security sector work and establishing co-operative arrangements with key partners;

*...while the Home Office can help with police reform.*

*Don't forget other sources of advice e.g. in academia.*

*Other lead departments will sometimes need to consult DFID e.g. on export licences for defence equipment.*

*A joined-up approach means coordination with other donors too...*

- addressing security sector issues in donor co-ordination fora such as Consultative Groups and Round Tables;
- incorporating security sector issues into donor country assistance strategies, public expenditure reviews, Comprehensive Development Frameworks, and Poverty Reduction Strategies.

*...including the multilaterals because of their influence on macro-economic policy...*

Multi-lateral development agencies have not had much direct involvement in the sector. As with other sectors, there may be a need to reconcile demands for reduced public spending under IFI macro-economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes with the needs of a sector reform programme, which may depend for its success on maintaining or even increasing expenditure. See Box 2.5.

#### **Box 2.5: Addressing security issues through poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP)**

The **PRSP** process offers a potentially important, though still relatively new, mechanism for mainstreaming security sector issues into development policy. PRSPs allow for a wide-ranging public discussion of spending priorities. This offers an opportunity to bring the security sector into the debate, and for an assessment of how competing demands on public resources from the security, social and economic sectors should be reconciled. There are, however, concerns about how far the poverty reduction framework can integrate security sector issues and, in particular, public views on those issues.

*...inter alia through the PSRP process.*

## 3. Donor strategy

### 3.1 The security sector in context

The security sector is crucial to political control. In many countries, the military is either in power or – together with other security and intelligence actors – propping up civilian regimes that do not have a popular mandate to govern. The military is often important economically: large standing armies provide a livelihood for many people; senior officers and politicians may derive considerable benefit from illicit activities such as diamond mining or corruption in military procurement. It is important to understand how reform will affect the distribution of resources and power, and to identify likely winners and losers and the likely strength of the latter's opposition.

*Vested interests may have strong - but not necessarily respectable - reasons to oppose reform...*

### 3.2 Other sensitivities

National defence and internal security are the traditional cornerstones of state sovereignty. Governments may have concerns about donors gathering intelligence for their own strategic reasons. They may be concerned about donors passing information to one another. Or they may be apprehensive about pressure to down-size or restructure in ways which they perceive as threatening their ability to guarantee national security. Nor will they want to embark on a lengthy reform process heavily dependent on external expertise and funding if there is any likelihood of the donor pulling out before the job is finished. This means that both sides have to reach a clear understanding as to their respective intentions and obligations, including entry and exit points. Given the sensitivities this may take time; but it is worth investing resources up-front in building a political coalition to sustain reforms and encourage national ownership.

*... partner governments may also have more legitimate sensitivities about external involvement in national defence...*

### 3.3 Consultation

Informal discussions between DFID staff and their counterparts in a host government will usually be the best starting point for a limited programme of assistance, particularly where it is politically sensitive. For more comprehensive reforms, a cross-departmental scoping mission involving DFID, FCO and MOD will often be necessary, along with consultations with other donors including the World Bank and the IMF.

*...consultations, should take account of the sensitivities...*

The objective is to gain a thorough understanding of security sector problems, of reforms already underway, and of what further support would be useful. Workshops which bring together key stakeholders from inside and outside the security sector can help to identify areas of common interest, and suggest appropriate entry points.

The breadth of the consultative process will vary according to the political context and culture. Some governments may, for example, be reluctant to bring in legislators, civil society groups and the intelligence services. The aim should be to involve a wide spectrum of interests which might include:

- the military, and the civilians who administer the military;
- others with an indirect interest in the outcome of reforms, including central spending and economic planning agencies such as the Ministry of Finance; the social ministries; civil society groups; the general public; opposition political parties; neighbouring countries; and the UN, World Bank, IMF and other donors;
- police, customs and immigration personnel;

*...but be as broad-based as possible.*

*Consultations should continue throughout the reform process.*

*High level commitment is a sine qua non; but it may take time to develop...*

*...nurture supporters and manage the risks posed by opponents.*

*The pace of reform needs to take account of local circumstances...*

*...and should be aimed at improving the proficiency of both the military and civil spheres; sequencing may be difficult.*

- academics and retired members of the security forces with constructive insights.

There will be a need for continuing consultation as reform proceeds, for example, to resolve any differences about the likely effectiveness of various options for achieving agreed goals. These arrangements can be formalised through, for example, a steering committee bringing together the key national stakeholders and donors, perhaps supported by an independent group of expert advisors.

### 3.4 Commitment

Reforms will not work without strong commitment at the highest levels of government, the military and other influential security and intelligence actors. Remember that the military have a near monopoly of force, and that it may be just as important to have the junior ranks on board as the generals. It may take time to build up commitment, and a constituency for change.

Initial consultations will start to reveal who is for the proposals and who is against. Understanding the interests and perspectives of the key stakeholders is essential to identify both champions and opponents of reform. Champions should be nurtured as reform proceeds. A strategy to manage the risks posed by opponents needs to be developed at design stage.

Where support is lukewarm it is best to start with activities designed to stimulate public debate and build political support. For example, the convening of a series of small workshops that bring together the military and other security and intelligence actors, civil servants, politicians, media and civil society groups, may be necessary to create a 'comfort zone' before a defence review or broad security review can be undertaken. Another option is to focus on technical improvements, such as the development of Defence White Papers, efficiency studies, improvements in human resource capacity, all of which can serve as a basis for wider reform later.

### 3.5 Pace of reforms

The starting point for security sector reform will differ from country to country, as will the path the process takes. In many cases fundamental institutional reforms may not be possible until there have been changes to mind-sets and political values. It is necessary to:

- take account of resource limits;
- take account of human capacity limitations (especially if other political and economic reforms are in train);
- build on existing institutional capabilities;
- prioritise;
- be politically realistic.

### 3.6 Sequencing of reforms

The reform agenda will usually need two prongs:

- a. direct engagement with the military and other security and intelligence actors to improve technical proficiency;
- b. reinforcing the civil and political management of the security sector to improve effectiveness and accountability.

The security forces themselves are likely to want to focus on (a), but on its own this will not lead to improved accountability and may not improve security. Nor is it possible to focus just on (b); the security forces are unlikely to buy into a programme with no obvious benefits for them. Sequencing can be particularly difficult where reforms are politically sensitive or the regulatory framework is weak.

In many cases, the starting point for security sector reform may be to address problems outside the security sector, relating to wider questions of administrative capacity and political governance. For instance, public expenditure management reform provides an opportunity to subject military spending to fiscal discipline, and for strategic thinking about the military's appropriate share of the national budget.

DFID needs to work closely with MOD and any other donors who are involved.

### 3.7 Key political and policy choices

The main political challenges<sup>1</sup> are:

- *military disengagement from politics* – developing political strategies and constitutional dispensations to facilitate the withdrawal of the military from a formal political role and prevent excessive influence over the political process;
- *military disengagement from other non-military roles* – the military very often plays significant economic, political and social roles beyond its traditional security remit. This can damage military professionalism, although some of these activities have other benefits. See Box 3.1.

#### BOX 3.1: Military role in development and commerce

The military is often one of the most developed national institutions and may play a role in disaster relief, the construction of rural infrastructure and public health care provision. Military involvement in private enterprise is also common. Excessive involvement in such activities may undermine both the readiness of the military for its primary mission, and its accountability to civil authorities. However, precipitate withdrawal will not always be in the public interest, eg where the military is providing an effective hospital service which the relevant civil authority is too weak to take on.

- *redefinition of security roles* – getting the military out of inappropriate internal security roles and ensuring there is appropriate legislation, political backing and funding to enable the police to fulfil its role effectively.
- *civilian policy-making role* – creating the bureaucratic structures and human capacities and skills to enable the civilian policy sectors to contribute effectively to the formulation of security policy;
- *re-professionalisation of the military* – developing a complementary set of skills, systems and an ethos within the military so that it can interact effectively with civilian counterparts and fulfil its security functions effectively.

*The military should be disengaged from politics...*

*...and they should also disengage from other inappropriate activities...*

*...though not with overdue haste.*

*Civilian policy-making structures may need strengthening... alongside the capacity of the military to interact effectively with them.*

<sup>1</sup> See Luckham 1995 for detail on the dilemmas of military disengagement and democratisation.



*Post-conflict situations may require radical restructuring.*

*More regional stability means less risk of conflict and less need for large armies.*

*National priorities should dictate the development agenda.*

- *military restructuring and demobilisation* – after wars, merging guerrilla forces and/or civil defence or local militia forces into national armies, redefining the armed forces’ role and mission, and ‘right-sizing’ them to meet the new political environment;
- *regional frameworks for peace* – strengthening regional confidence-building measures to ensure the sustainability of peace agreements, to reduce regional instability (which contributes to the maintenance of large standing armies and elevated levels of military spending), and to prevent conflicts from spreading across national boundaries;
- *managing relations with donors* – ensuring that international assistance is consistent with national needs and priorities, and that aid conditionalities do not undermine national policymaking processes.

# 4. Diagnosis

## 4.1 Taking a strategic approach

It is important to take a comprehensive view of the overall reform process. This will help the recipient government to develop a wider reform strategy and to strengthen political support for change, even if DFID is to work in just one area. Moreover the success of the DFID-supported reforms may depend on events elsewhere, both in the sector and beyond: for example financial reforms may need to be part of general public expenditure management reform; or improvements in the defence ministry part of a general civil service reform effort.

The overall process has to be founded on a view of the history and evolution of the security sector and what it is for. This will vary from place to place, and has to be determined according to local circumstances: the principal threats to the security of the particular state and the safety of its citizens. Nowadays these threats often arise from circumstances within states, for which traditional military responses are ill-suited. In such cases it is especially important to see where the responsibilities of the military should end, and those of the police and other security actors begin. It may also be necessary to encourage governments to put greater emphasis on political, diplomatic, social and economic instruments to address security problems.

*Reforms must be set in the wider context...*

*...and start with an understanding of what the particular security sector is for.*

## 4.2 Using the Governance Review Framework

Part 6 of the DFID Governance Review Framework (“National Security and Conflict Prevention”) provides useful guidance on diagnostic questions (see Box 4.1; the full framework can be found on the Governance Resource Centre website). The review bibliography will give additional guidance on country-specific sources of information.

*The Governance Review Framework will help to answer these questions.*

### BOX 4.1: Governance Review Framework

**Key Capability:**

**“to manage national security accountability and to resolve differences before they develop into violent conflicts”**

6.1 How far is the government able to maintain security throughout the country in a lawful and accountable manner?

6.2 How free is the country from the operation of paramilitary units, private armies, guerrilla forces and ‘warlordism’?

6.3 How well is the government informed, organised and resourced to decide and implement defence and security policy?

6.4 How capable is the government of dealing with trans-national and other organised crime?

6.5 How effective is civil control over the armed forces and security services, and how free are the political and judicial systems from their interference?

6.6 How much confidence do people have in the state’s capacity to maintain their security?

6.7 What measures, if any, are being taken to remedy publicly identified problems in this field, and what degree of political priority and public support do they have?

*What are the security, political and social contexts?*

*There will often be a need for a better institutional framework and enhanced technical competence on all sides...*

*...and one won't work without the other.*

*Does the sector have a proper legal framework? And how far is it observed?*

### 4.3 The parameters of a sector assessment

Prior to conducting a sector appraisal, it is useful to identify the broad parameters of the assessment process. The kind of issues to consider are:

- **What is the security context?** Has the country enjoyed a long period of peace or has it faced external and/or internal conflicts?
- **What is the political context?** Is the military involved directly in politics? Or indirectly where governments have enacted oppressive internal security measures. Do the executive, legislature and judiciary have the capacity and/or the will to exert control over the security sector?
- **How are relations between the military and civilian policy sectors, and between the military and the police?** In many countries, there is a chasm, with each side having only a superficial understanding of the other's activities and interests, and mutual suspicion.
- **Is there a social demand for security sector reform?** If so, how much, and what matters to people most?

### 4.4 Governance or technical solutions?

Security sector programmes will generally need to address two sets of issues:

- *Quality of governance* – the clarity, openness and responsiveness of the relationships between security sector institutions, the wider government apparatus, and the general public.
- *Technical competence* – the human resource capacities and the institutional structures and processes that underpin the functioning of the security sector.

Most countries will face problems under both headings. Political obstacles to reform and weak administrative capacity usually make it very difficult to progress on both fronts at once, but reform on one front but not the other is unlikely to work: making the security forces more competent without strengthening the capacity of the civil and political institutions to manage them effectively, may result in abuses of power; civil and political institutions primed to exercise proper oversight will not be able to do so if the military, intelligence and police forces lack the competence to manage their budgets and produce proper accounts. The answer is usually to set reforms internal to the security sector in a wider reform programme that strengthens the appropriate instruments within the civilian policy sectors. This will generally imply a gradual approach.

### 4.5 The institutional context

The rules by which the security-sector operates are likely to be shaped both by formal laws and regulations and by informal practices. Often the legislation that specifies the roles and mandates of the security and intelligence communities will be vague or require updating to respond to changes in the security environment. Even if the legislation is clear, actual practice may follow quite different informal customs and incentive systems.

## 4.6 The regional context

As noted in Section 3.7, regional instability can stand in the way of reform. The persistence of regional tensions may make governments reluctant to reduce military spending and the size of unaffordable standing armies, for fear of undermining perceived defence needs. The international community can assist by:

- helping to broker or consolidate peace agreements reached between disputing nations or between political groups that receive external support.
- strengthening the capacity of regional peace-keeping forces, eg through BMATTs, along with support for strengthening UN peacekeeping capacity.
- promoting regional confidence-building initiatives, as in the case of SADC (see box 4.2).
- working to increase the effectiveness of regional and sub-regional organisations with a mandate for regional security, such as ECOWAS.
- encouraging countries to consult with their neighbours and to make the regional issue an explicit focus of the national security debate.

*Consider what can be done to help reduce any regional instability.*

### Box 4.2: Regional confidence-building in Southern Africa

The **African Civil-Military Relations Project** at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, funded by DFID, works to strengthen regional co-operation on security issues among all 14 Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. The principle aim is to build a sustainable dialogue between the armed forces and political and civilian authorities, to create common understanding and build consensus and trust.

But remember that reforms meant to reduce tension can have the opposite effect if the neighbours do not understand the purpose, and feel threatened.

## 4.7 Identifying entry points

Entry points will vary according to local circumstances. For example:

- where there is a solid legal and policy framework and a highly professional ethos in the security forces, strengthening human resource capacity in the security sector may be all that is required;
- in countries emerging from war, where the security forces have lost legitimacy, 'root and branch' reforms may be needed involving extensive restructuring of the security sector and changes in mechanisms for civil control;
- in other cases, technical and organisational changes may have little impact until there has been a broader transformation of mind-sets and values among both the political classes and the security forces.

*Choose entry points according to local circumstances.*

The seven areas most likely to serve as entry points are:

- Building public awareness and engagement.
- Building strategic planning capacity.
- Strengthening legal and constitutional frameworks.
- Strengthening civil oversight mechanisms.
- Strengthening financial management systems.
- Facilitating war-to-peace transitions.
- Improving human resource management.

These seven areas are each examined more closely in Chapters 5 to 11.

## 5. Building public awareness

### Purpose of assistance

To encourage public debate on security issues and the role of the security forces in society, as well as engagement by non-state actors in the reform process.

### Method

- support educational activities to improve understanding of security sector issues among the general population;
- build capacity among civil society groups to articulate the needs and priorities of their constituencies, and to provide constructive input to the reform process;
- support seminars or 'national conferences' that bring together members of civil society, the security forces and government for open exchanges of views.

*Civic awareness of security issues can help improve public/security sector relations...*

*...and create a wider consensus for reform.*

*Civil society can monitor security sector activities and comment on policy...*

*...and pressure from civil society may provide the best impetus for change.*

*Improve civil society's understanding of security issues through education ...*

### 5.1 Reasons for intervention

In many countries, there is little public discussion on what role the military should play in society, how they should be managed, and what resources they should have. The general public may lack confidence in – and even fear – the military and police. Improving civic awareness of security issues is a starting point for improving relations between the security forces and the public, creating a national consensus on a reform programme, and building political coalitions to sustain the process.

Civil society can also play more specific roles by facilitating dialogue, monitoring the activities of the security forces, and expressing views on security policy as well as providing policy advice. This may be particularly useful where state capacity is weak: the role of legislatures or other government departments in analysing security issues, for instance, can be greatly enhanced by assistance from specialist external campaigning groups or think-tanks providing research and analytical support. See Box 5.1.

Working through civil society is a priority for DFID. Because of the sensitivity of security sector reform in some countries, more can be accomplished in terms of achieving reform objectives if the impetus for change is internally generated through civil society.

### 5.2 Some suggestions for support

#### Civil society

- strengthen the capacity of civil society groups to play a constructive advocacy role through basic training on conflict management and human rights issues, and participation in wider debates on security sector reform;
- encourage civil society participation in the reintegration of former combatants into local communities;
- support training courses on defence resource management, budgetary processes, and other aspects of security sector reform.

**The media**

- training activities including on investigative techniques and security and defence-related issues.

**Research institutes and think-tanks**

- build capacity through international networking

**Public awareness**

- support for awareness campaigns on specific issues like small arms and anti-personnel mines

**Coalition building**

- support for regional-learning initiatives that bring together members of government, security and intelligence actors and civil society from different countries.

**Box 5.1: Consensus building in Ghana and Sierra Leone**

In June 2000, **African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR)** in Ghana ran a three-day 'Roundtable on Security Sector Reform and Democratisation: Ghana and South Africa', in part supported by DFID. The roundtable was a ground-breaking initiative aimed at fostering broader dialogue on the role and governance of Ghanaian security forces - the first time that a civil society group had brought together military and police officers, intelligence personnel, and members of the civilian policy sectors to discuss security-related matters. The presence of the press allowed the debates to be shared with the wider public. The Ghanaian government agreed to a further series of meetings to broaden and deepen the dialogue.

In 2000, the **Campaign for Good Governance** produced a civic education handbook on national security in Sierra Leone. This provided civil society groups with an opportunity to express their views on a number of contentious issues in the Government's military reform programme, including the plan to re-integrate members of the former armed forces - which had mutinied in May 1997 - into the national army. There was also discussion about the future role of various civil defence forces which, along with the army, had been involved in serious abuses of human rights in various parts of the country. The handbook was funded by DFID and produced in collaboration with the Police, Ministry of Defence and National Security Adviser's Office of Sierra Leone.

*...by better understanding in the media...*

*...through think-tanks networking internationally...*

*..and public awareness campaigns.*

*Coalitions for reform can be built regionally as well as nationally.*

## 6. Building strategic planning capacity

### **Purpose of assistance**

To help governments assess how to most effectively meet their security needs by drawing upon the full range of resources and policy instruments at their disposal.

### **Method**

Help to build the capacity of both civilians and security personnel to conduct joint strategic planning exercises and institutional evaluations, and to produce relevant legislation.

Help develop central co-ordination and policy-making machinery for military and security matters.

*The security sector needs to work within a national security policy...*

*...worked out with the civil authorities and set within overall national policy...*

*A security review is a first step – identifying the threats and how to contain them...*

*...remembering that that some threats to security are best dealt with without recourse to the security sector.*

### 6.1 Reasons for an intervention

A national security policy sets the framework for how a country will respond to the key security threats it faces. It is usually adopted in national legislation and enjoys the force of law. It identifies the roles that the key security actors will play; provides a reference for parliamentary debate and a basis for validation of structures within the security sector; and allows the public a general overview on national defence and public security policy.

Strategic planning is often left to the military. It should not be. Partnership-based approaches involving both civilians and the security forces are important. Defence and public security policy has to be set in the context of national policy as a whole. This requires integrated political and policy responses involving those responsible for foreign relations, the economy and social affairs as well as security.

Policy makers also require the tools and skills to compare defence needs with priorities in other sectors, and to assess how governments can respond most effectively to security problems.

### 6.2 Strategic security assessment

The preparation of a defence or security review, often followed by a 'white paper', is an important step in defining a national security policy. A review of the security environment identifies the principal internal and external security threats that a country faces and the options for containing or addressing them, enabling the government to update its national security policy and – where reforms are required within the security sector – to establish a realistic road-map for implementation.

Expanding a defence review process to incorporate a fuller treatment of the broader security environment, including the role of the public security and legal apparatus, may allow for a more comprehensive assessment of security needs and options for addressing them – including the role of the ministries in the economic and social sectors.

### Conducting a security review

There is no set process for conducting a security review. Its scope and nature will be determined by the government's priorities and political culture, the quality of human resources it has at its disposal, and the degree to which the concerns of civil society are taken into consideration.

It should, however, be civilian-led with responsibility shared by a range of stakeholders:

- The Executive, often supported and advised by a National Security Committee comprising experts from both inside and outside government.
- The legislature.
- Ministries of defence, interior, finance, foreign affairs and justice, and the state intelligence and security agencies.
- Ministries responsible for health and education who increasingly have an interest in influencing security policy.

Factors which will influence the overall quality and relevance of the review include:

- the availability and quality of information and data provided;
- the level and quality of consultation and debate within government departments and the legislature;
- the degree to which input from civilians and, where possible, non-state actors, is solicited and taken into account;
- the means and ability to determine and cost strategic needs accurately.

#### Box 6.1: East Timor's security review

In July 2000, the UK government funded a wide-ranging review of **East Timor's** future defence and internal security needs. The study examined how to turn the country's armed liberation movement, Falantil, into a national defence force that could provide adequate security from the threat posed by militias massed on the Western border with Indonesia. Consideration was also given to various options for providing internal security, and the dilemmas posed if the country's new army were to fulfil this function. Pre-requisites for the success of the reform process were found to include the interim presence of a UN peace-keeping force and appropriate assistance from donor countries.

A comprehensive defence review requires a sophisticated political environment and significant capacity in the security sector. Where this does not exist reviews should focus on priority issues and on developing the process. Simply broadening the debate beyond the military may facilitate a fuller and more strategic assessment.

## 6.3 Monitoring and evaluation

The answers to the following questions will help in assessing the effectiveness of the security policy process:

- To what extent are different components of the administration, especially different ministries, consulted in the making of security policy?
- To what extent are senior public servants free to give independent policy advice to ministers without fear of adverse consequences?
- To what extent does the security sector understand that its priorities must be judged against those of other sectors, that the budgeting process is iterative and that it may well have to re-think its strategy in light of what is affordable?

*There is no set process...*

*...but reviews should be civilian-led with broad stakeholder participation...*

*...a full review is a complex exercise...*

*...if there is insufficient capacity a simpler approach should be adopted in the first instance.*



- Are there specialist bodies (e.g. units in the Prime Minister or President's Office, think tanks) that review security policy and prepare or review policy initiatives?
- Does government publish and circulate policy proposals before embarking on new security legislation?
- Are there mechanisms for co-ordinating government policy and action around security issues, such as a cabinet and cabinet office, and are they effective?
- To what extent, and in what ways, do NGOs influence and inform policymaking?

# 7. Strengthening constitutional and legal frameworks

## **Purpose of assistance**

To help establish the roles and mandates of the security forces, and the hierarchy of authority between them, the legislature and the executive.

To help ensure that there are clear constitutional provisions and/or legislation enshrining the agreed roles, mandates and hierarchies.

To help ensure that these provisions operate effectively.

## **Method**

Provide experts to advise on:

- > Roles and mandates.
- > Constitutional law.
- > Specific legislation for each of the security services.
- > Human rights issues.

## 7.1 Legal and Institutional framework

The various security and intelligence actors should operate within a clear legal and institutional framework governing their roles, mandates, and the hierarchy of authority between them, the legislature and the executive. The rules should make clear who has external and internal roles respectively, and how internal responsibilities are apportioned. Rules should be enforced through strong political commitment and effective instruments in both the civil domain and the security services.

*Roles and responsibilities in the security sector should be clearly defined by law...*

The constitution usually clarifies who is head of the armed forces, and their relationship with the other security forces, the legislature and the executive, and civil society.

Other legislation, such as a Defence Act in the case of the military, may prescribe the specific responsibilities and functions of the various security actors. There may be laws which stipulate immunities enjoyed by the security forces. In some countries customary law may also govern the activities of the security forces. Issues to be addressed in national legislation can include:

- The role of the legislature and audit agencies in scrutinising security policy and spending.
- Specific mandates e.g. to ensure against overlaps between police, paramilitary and gendarmerie-style organisations, and the army.
- The internal security role of the military during both peace-time situations and states of civil emergency or natural disaster.
- Roles of the military and civilian intelligence and security agencies, including mechanisms of oversight and accountability.
- The extent and nature of the military's non-security roles in public life.

*...a constitutional and legislative review will establish whether the framework is right...*

*...but constitutional reviews can take some time.*

*Post-war situations may require a radical overhaul.*

*Both security sector personnel and the general public need to understand the constitutional provisions.*

*Non-statutory security forces need to be either brought within the law, or disbanded.*

## 7.2 Constitutional and legislative reviews

Such reviews can present an opportunity to build consensus on the role of the security forces in public life.

Some time may need to be allowed for constitutional reviews, especially where they involve consultation with the wider population, e.g. by referendum.

In post-war situations, a fundamental re-orientation of the role of the military may be required, with constitutional review processes addressing a range of fundamental issues:

- How 'national security' should be defined and implemented.
- How to get the military out of internal security roles more appropriate to the civil police.
- The channels through which the security forces and the military, in particular, can become involved in politics.
- The nature and level of public and parliamentary participation in the development of security policy.
- International legal conventions and laws to which the country is a party and which govern the conduct of the security sector.

The principles of security sector governance, once enshrined in constitutions, can be integrated both into public education and into training programmes for security sector personnel.

## 7.3 Non-statutory security forces

In many countries there exists a range of 'non-statutory' security forces whose role is not covered by national legislation (see Box 7.1). This can include local militias or private 'body-guard' units financed through off-budget sources of public expenditure, and closely linked to political interests. These forces need to be brought within the national legal and security framework – perhaps as a form of reserve security force – to ensure that they have a stake in co-operating with the national security forces. (Private armies run by warlords or drug barons are in a different category and may need to be disbanded rather than integrated; similarly in some cases guerrilla armies.)

### Box 7.1: Civil defence forces in Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone so-called civil defence forces emerged in response to community-level security problems that were not addressed by national forces. The civil defence forces have traditionally been managed through various forms of local and customary authority.

Where political factions come to power with the support of guerrilla armies, these forces are often transformed into a national army. But their political allegiances will often remain closely tied to their former commanders and political patrons.

## 7.4 Accountability systems

Accountability systems and redress mechanisms should ensure against abuse of power by the security forces. The effectiveness of these mechanisms will depend in large part on how free the political and judicial systems are from interference by the security forces.

The military have their own legally binding rules and regulations. Military law, for example, is used to hold soldiers and officers accountable for abuse and other misconduct or inappropriate behaviour. Internal military tribunals are common.

In some countries, the military has also elaborated a code of conduct which defines their public role. This code of conduct may be informal and voluntary or may become part of the constitutional legislation governing the security sector. To be effective it requires a strong legal framework and an appropriate level of professionalism within the security forces.

Human rights abuses and other forms of serious misconduct by the security forces are usually investigated and tried through these internal mechanisms. In cases where a civilian is involved, those guilty of misconduct may be tried in a civil court. National constitutions, supreme court rulings, or other jurisprudence determine which courts have jurisdiction.

Redress mechanisms for victims include:

- Independent complaints commissions.
- Ombudsmen.
- Civil society organisations that represent the public in their dealings with the military.

Important elements of international law include:

- International Humanitarian Law which is binding upon individual security personnel, and breaches of which may be punishable under criminal law.
- The provisions of the Geneva Conventions, which are binding upon every individual, and often incorporated in manuals of military law.

International tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions can serve both to deter violations of human rights by security forces and to build public confidence. The legislature can also play this role (See section 8).

*The military should be made accountable for their actions, with means of redress for victims of unacceptable behaviour.*

## 8. Strengthening civil oversight mechanisms

### Purpose of assistance

To help establish suitable mechanisms and to build capacity to enable the legislature to exercise effective oversight of security policy and expenditure.

To strengthen the role of ministers and civil servants in managing the security sector.

To encourage non-governmental bodies seeking to play an oversight role.

### Method

Provide experts to advise on:

- Legislative procedures.
- Support requirements for legislative select committees.

Provide seminars and training for:

- Members of committees.
- Committee clerks.

Provide study visits for committee members to see how committees function elsewhere.

Support civil service reform, especially strengthening of ministries of defence, audit offices, ministry of finance budgetary procedures, and the civilian intelligence and security agencies.

Provide advice to interested civil society organisations.

Provide support for security think tanks.

*Legislatures and ministries have a duty to oversee the security sector. Both may need help to do this effectively...*

*...informal oversight bodies can also play a useful role.*

*Legislative oversight needs good systems and competent and well-informed legislators, prepared to be critical...*

Legislatures offer another mechanism to monitor and control Government security policy, and the public expenditure necessary to fund the security forces. In practice, especially where the political system is weak, legislatures often play little more than a cosmetic role.

Civilian ministries responsible for managing the security forces need to be able to do so effectively. They include the finance ministry. Other ministries should also be able to take an informed interest, given the implications of military expenditure for their budgets. They include the finance and, where separate, planning ministries.

In addition to formal oversight mechanisms, a range of independent bodies can play a role in enhancing transparency and accountability within the security sector.

### 8.1 Legislative oversight

The quality of legislative oversight depends partly on structures and systems, and partly on the competence and knowledge of the legislators.

There are procedural mechanisms that can help to strengthen the ability of legislators to hold ministers to account for security policy, even where legislative independence is weak:

- The power to summon ministers from defence and other ministries to appear regularly before plenary sessions or committees.

- Annual opportunities to debate strategic policy issues, such as Defence White papers, the military procurement programme.

The degree to which members of the legislature can act independently will nevertheless largely determine how critical they are prepared to be of government and how effectively they will hold government to account.

### Secrecy and confidentiality

The military and other security and intelligence actors often try to limit the amount and quality of the information they release. Proper accountability and transparency require that information be withheld only for legitimate reasons – which need to be tightly defined. The demands of national security do require some secrecy and confidentiality, but too much of it can be counter-productive. Secrecy can e.g. be used as a cover for financial mismanagement or illegal activities.

*...and supported by strict limits on what can be kept from them as "secret".*

## 8.2 Permanent Specialist Committees

A key mechanism for legislative oversight is a system of Permanent Specialist Committees at which Ministers, their officials and serving members of the security forces can be summoned and quizzed in depth about aspects of policy and practice.

*Specialist committees can be a powerful way of exercising legislative oversight...*

A Defence Committee to monitor the Armed Forces can play a particularly important role vis-à-vis military spending – an area where there is only one primary customer, very few suppliers and great scope for inefficiency and corruption.

A Public Accounts Committee, with the help of independent auditors, can report on the efficiency and effectiveness with which the various security forces have used their resources.

The intelligence services, both on the civilian and military side, should also be subject to parliamentary oversight.

Committees should be able to set their own agendas. They require wide access to information from government departments, and should have sufficient staff and resources to pursue inquiries thoroughly, including the power and resources to use outside expertise. In small countries, where the legislature is too small to maintain effective permanent select committees, respected members of civil society can be called on.

*...provided they have sufficient independence and resources...*

By developing its own centres of permanent expertise, the legislature will be far better placed both to understand and to interrogate the security sector. This process should also serve to build trust and confidence between parliament and the security forces.

*...and information.*

There is no blueprint for an effective system of civil oversight of the security sector<sup>2</sup>. Legislatures can learn from the experiences of select committees in other countries through study visits. Websites offer another opportunity to learn about international best practice.

<sup>2</sup> See Sammonds (2000) for a discussion of the differences between countries.

*An effective defence ministry should be civilian-run...*

*...which may mean a culture change for the military as well as improved civilian capacity..*

*...likely to be required in other ministries too.*

*Civilian intelligence and security bodies may also need strengthening.*

*External specialists can advise both legislators and government departments...*

*...and there may be other independent oversight bodies with a useful role.*

## 8.3 Enhancing the role of ministers and civil servants

### **Civilianising Defence ministries**

Defence ministries are often inappropriately structured and largely staffed by military personnel. A civilianised defence ministry is a key element in extending civil control over the security sector, and ensuring strong partnerships between civilians and members of the security forces.

This may involve organisational changes and the introduction of new procedures to introduce clear chains of command that ensure civil oversight. It is likely to mean tackling both a military culture that is resistant to civilianisation, and a lack of civilian capacity.

### **Civilian-led strategic policy making**

As noted in Chapter 6, effective strategic policy planning within the security sector requires strong partnerships between civilians and the security forces. Ministers and civil servants from a number of departments need to be involved, and will need an understanding of the issues both broadly and in relation to their respective departmental concerns.

Attention should also be paid to strengthening the civilian intelligence and security bodies which often report directly to the Executive. Properly tasked and managed, they can play an important role in advising governments on security policy. But there should also be mechanisms in place to ensure appropriate levels of oversight of their activities.

## 8.4 Specialist advice

The ability of the legislative and government departments to analyse security issues can be greatly enhanced by research and analytical support from specialist external campaigning groups or think-tanks.

## 8.5 Independent oversight mechanisms

Given sufficient independence and credibility, the following can be useful:

- Public complaints bodies with powers of access and investigation.
- Quasi-independent National Human Rights commissions which have the potential to improve systems of accountability by dealing with complaints, investigating violations of the law, and co-ordinating debate.
- Ombudsmen to investigate alleged human rights abuses by state bodies.

# 9. Strengthening financial management systems

## Purpose of assistance

To help establish the principles and practices of good governance in the management of the security sector: transparency, accountability, anti-corruption, auditing.

## Method

Reforming the financial management of the security sector needs to be tackled in the context of public financial management generally. For guidance see:

*“Understanding and Reforming Public Expenditure Management – Guidelines for DFID” – DFID March 2002.*

*“Off-budget Military Expenditure and Revenue” – report by Dylan Hendrickson and Nicole Ball (consultants) for DFID, January 2002.*

See Footnote

## 9.1 Reasons for intervention

The security sector often absorbs a larger share of national resources than is affordable. The same principles and practices of good governance – anti-corruption, accountability, transparency and auditing – which should apply to other components of the public budget should also apply to the security sector. Improving the efficiency of allocations and spending in the sector requires robust financial management systems run by qualified personnel, but there must also be a political commitment to ensure greater transparency and accountability.

*Poor governance can result in security sectors which cost too much...*

## 9.2 Sector-specific considerations

### Essential pre-requisites

- Where necessary, a process agreed with International Financial Institutions and donors to reform and strengthen financial management and information systems, both within finance ministries and different branches of the security forces;
- individual security ministries (defence, interior, etc.) who can take the lead in developing initial budget projections in collaboration with the services under their authority;
- finance ministries with the necessary skills and political backing to have access to security budgets and the ability to make an adequate assessment of whether funds are effectively disbursed to the appropriate level and accounted for. Outside scrutiny is particularly important in the context of a reform process.

*...one solution is more effective financial management and information systems...*

*...including spending ministries able to develop budgets...*

*...and finance ministries able to assess the budgets and ensure that money is properly spent and accounted for.*

<sup>3</sup> For ongoing work in this area, see Nicole Ball and Malcolm Holmes *“Integrating Defence into Public Expenditure”* January 2002.



**Box 9.1: Managing military expenditure**

In February 2000, DFID hosted an international symposium on security-sector reform and military expenditure. The key message of this symposium was that donors need to move away from a narrow focus on pressuring countries to reduce military spending. More important than the level of security expenditures is the manner in which military budgets are determined. From a governance perspective, what matters is that military budgets should be subject to scrutiny, reporting and auditing in the same way as civil budgets. Helping countries to manage military expenditure effectively therefore requires placing greater emphasis on defence resource management practices and broadening the public debate on how to reconcile security spending with other competing demands.

*The basic decision on how much to spend should emerge from the strategic planning process ...*

*...off-budget financing needs to be brought to an end...*

*...but may be encouraged by forcing the pace on expenditure cuts.*

*Poor personnel systems can put money in the wrong pockets...*

**Resource mobilisation**

Judgement as to what constitutes an acceptable level of security expenditure must take into account genuine security needs and what is affordable, both of which vary between countries. This judgement should be a major output of the strategic planning process described in Chapter 6. Determination of what is unproductive or excessive is not immediately evident because in many countries the security sector has become an informal social safety net – masking welfare payments to soldiers and their families.

Where public resources are constrained, security forces may resort to off-budget sources of financing through involvement in commercial or criminal activities – especially in poor countries where the government's ability to raise revenue through taxation is limited. Criminal activities should be brought to an end. Legal activities that are taxable should be taxed. In the long term the military should be funded from government revenues: a self-funding military has no reason to submit to civil government control.

Security sector reform may in some cases require an increase in security spending in order to achieve reform objectives. In other cases, governments may decide to re-allocate resources away from the security sector. Attempts by IFIs and donors to force a rapid reduction in military spending are often counter-productive, and may serve only to encourage governments to resort to creative accounting to hide military expenditure. In the long run, this increases the autonomy of the security forces and reduces their accountability.

**Personnel, pay and pensions**

A poorly-managed personnel system increases opportunities for corruption and undermines the ability of the security services to manage and control their personnel. Advanced pay roll systems can get rid of 'ghost' personnel but powerful vested interests may seek to thwart their introduction.

Other useful measures include:

- a detailed central database linked to payrolls, to record the strengths of all units/formations and changes resulting from deaths, absences without leave, etc.;
- a manpower audit that specifies missions and tasks, and recommends numbers, ranks and qualifications of personnel;
- identity cards, paybooks and/or identification tags to verify the identity of the personnel being paid and ensure they are paid the correct amount.

For further guidance see:

**Improving pay and Controlling Employment in the Public Service  
Governance Department, DFID, 2001.**

**Procurement, logistics and operations**

Effective logistics and resourcing are essential for the smooth functioning of the security forces. They are often the first component to be cut in times of financial crisis. Without effective logistic support, security operations will be severely undermined.

Procurement processes, particularly within the military where a high premium is placed on modern equipment, are always difficult to manage even where stringent procurement procedures are in place. Procurement spending is often broken down into ‘classified’ and ‘unclassified’ categories reflecting the degree of secrecy surrounding the purchase of particular items of equipment. Excessive secrecy can provide the cover for lax financial control, lavish and unnecessary expenditure, and corruption.

There is a need for stringent procurement procedures to ensure adequate financial control and value for money. External assistance can help to strengthen procurement processes in line with international best practise. This should form a key activity in addressing security sector reform.

*...and poor  
procurement processes  
can be a major source  
of corruption and  
excess spending.*

**Box 9.2: Uganda Defence Efficiency Study**

In 1998, the Ugandan government commissioned a study of the defence budget in order to maximise the efficiency of defence spending. The DFID-funded study identified six priority needs:

- a. increasing transparency and openness in the budgeting process;
- b. a manpower audit;
- c. reform of procurement arrangements;
- d. provision of identity cards, tags, and paybooks to defence personnel;
- e. improved audit and audit trails; and
- f. a stronger role for the MOD Accounting Office.

# 10. Facilitating war-to-peace transitions

## **Purpose of assistance**

To help restore basic state security capacity and to lay the groundwork for longer-term institutional reforms.

To help address the social, political and military legacies of war.

## **Method**

Provide experts to advise on:

- > strengthening the police if necessary to enable them to provide public security;
- > strengthening the mechanisms for civil oversight of the military;
- > demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants;
- > disarmament strategies.

*Post-war, governments (and donors) will have many priorities...*

*...including legacies from the conflict affecting the security sector...*

*...although security sector reform may have to wait until more urgent problems have been dealt with.*

*Peace agreements can be an opportunity to begin some restructuring especially with demobilisation...*

## 10.1 Reasons for intervention

War to peace transitions may need donor interventions in many areas: much of the machinery of government may have broken down; health, education and other services may no longer function; there may be large numbers of refugees; and so on. There could well be FCO involvement in the peace process, and MOD involvement in right-sizing the armed forces. DFID could be involved in a number of areas possibly including restoration of a weakened police force to enable it to resume its public security responsibilities.

There are several important legacies of contemporary armed conflicts<sup>3</sup> which directly impact on the structure and functioning of the security sector and hence will influence the reform process:

- the proliferation of predatory armed groups, for whom war and criminal activity are a livelihood;
- the development of criminal networks, often with regional and international dimensions, protected by armed groups;
- the disappearance of the central state and the emergence of security voids that open the way to competing forms of political authority;
- the reinforcement of authoritarianism and the political weight of military and security establishments which may impede reform.

These circumstances may or may not be propitious for security sector reform as described in earlier chapters of this guide: fundamental reforms might have to take a back seat while basic state capacities and political stability are restored.

## 10.2 Demilitarisation

Peace agreements offer a window of opportunity to begin restructuring the security sector by disbanding and disarming armed forces and merging rebel forces into a new national army. These 'surface' level reforms can help to put an end to fighting. More fundamental reforms will usually not be possible until conflicts have been shifted from the military to

<sup>3</sup> See Kaldor and Luckham (2001) for a detailed discussion of the legacies of conflict.

the political arena and until basic administrative capacity in the area of planning and implementation of policy has been restored.

### Demobilisation and reintegration

The demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants underpins the restoration of political stability. Demobilisation saves money, and tends to be a high priority given other post-war demands on public resources e.g. from the social and economic sectors. But reintegration, which is equally important, is costly and for that reason is often neglected. The success of reintegration efforts will have a large impact on the sustainability of a peace process. If demobilisation is poorly implemented, former troops can become a major source of lawlessness, posing in turn a significant obstacle to security sector reform and restoration of the rule of law<sup>4</sup>.

Down-sizing also tends to be seen as a way to achieve rapid reductions in military spending, though this will rarely be the case unless there are corresponding improvements in governance. This makes it important to address demobilisation as part of a wider process of security-sector reform.

There are four priorities:

- security reviews to establish future staffing and training requirements, allowing for the merger of rebel forces;
- strengthening of personnel and financial management systems;
- strengthening complementary mechanisms of financial control in the civilian policy sectors (see Chapter 9);
- establishing a political framework conducive to the integration of rebel forces into mainstream political and social life.

### Child soldiers

Child soldiers are a particular priority in demobilisation processes and have special needs that development assistance can address. In the longer term the issue needs to be addressed as part of security sector reform programmes for example by sensitising the authorities to international laws pertaining to child soldiers, and strengthening state capacity to regulate their recruitment.

### Disarmament issues

Efforts to address the problems associated with the destabilising spread of small arms can be addressed in the context of efforts to defuse the tensions following wars and preceding security sector reform. Strategies include:

- restoring effective mechanisms to maintain public security and regulate gun ownership, including within the security sector;
- increasing state capacity to monitor, check and prevent illegal arms transfers and to collect and destroy surplus weapons.

*...but this can go horribly wrong if there are no proper arrangements for reintegrating combatants into civilian life...*

*...and is unlikely to produce big savings without simultaneous improvements in governance.*

*Child soldiers, and their special needs, should take priority.*

*...and any proliferation of small arms should be dealt with.*

<sup>4</sup> For additional information, see UNDP (1999) and GTZ (1997).

### Box 10.1 : Regional disarmament initiatives in West Africa

Civil Society groupings in West Africa have played a crucial role in launching awareness campaigns about the dangers posed by the uncontrolled proliferation of small weapons in the region. A network of NGOs from Guinea, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone has been working with the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to strengthen the capacity of civil society to participate in implementing the W. Africa Moratorium signed in October 1998. In March 1999, civil society organisations came together with UNDP and ECOWAS heads of state to elaborate the modalities of the **Programme for the Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED)** – the designated implementation mechanism.

# 11. Improving human resource management

## **Purpose of assistance**

To promote a sense of public duty and political neutrality among the security forces.

## **Method**

Support training which will:

- promote respect for human rights, democratic accountability, international humanitarian law;
- strengthen conflict resolution and negotiation skills;
- increase awareness of the responsibilities of the security forces to the public, including gender awareness.

Encourage the adoption of pay and conditions of service which allow and encourage personnel to behave with due professionalism.

## 11.1 Reasons for intervention

Training for the security forces is an important component of broader efforts to strengthen the legal and administrative framework for managing the security sector and for developing a deeper sense of professionalism. Decent conditions of service are another.

*Professional security forces need proper training and conditions of service...*

## 11.2 Training

DFID does not provide direct support for programmes that improve the operational effectiveness of the military, paramilitary bodies, or intelligence services (although activities in this category can be an important aspect of an effective and durable approach to security-sector reform, particularly in instances where countries face imminent security threats). But working through its partners, including NGOs, it can support training activities for security forces that are designed to improve effective civil control and improve relations with the public.

*...DFID can help with training designed to improve effective civil control and relations with the public.*

The aim of training is to develop security forces so that they can fulfil their legitimate duties in a professional manner. Professionalism is reflected in the level of the morale of the security forces, in the trust they have in their leadership and the general public in them, and in their compliance with legal requirements and codes of conduct.

The following stages of training provide a general framework for training, though each of the security forces have specific requirements depending on their roles and mandates. These include elements designed to strengthen democratic governance, human rights, law enforcement capacity, and fighting capability:

- *Initial training.* For a soldier these will include personal fighting skills; and for a policeman, law enforcement techniques. Initial training should also include elements on civic education, human rights and international humanitarian law.
- *Continuation training.* This will generally involve annual testing and strengthening of basic training standards. For the military, these may range from shooting and fitness

tests, to knowledge of the Law of War and how it applies to the individual or group. Police will receive instruction to reinforce their understanding of human rights law.

- *Peacekeeping training.* Peacekeeping training should include familiarisation with working with other civilian agencies and non-government organisations, impartiality, rules of engagement and the use of minimum force.
- *Command and staff training.* The purpose is to educate and teach officers in both the military and national police command and staff managerial functions and their wider responsibilities as servants of the state.

A programme of re-training may be necessary where guerrilla forces have been integrated into a national army or where soldiers and police have not previously had a comprehensive training programme.

### 11.3 Pay and conditions

Creating the appropriate incentives for security personnel to carry out their jobs properly also requires attention to ensuring appropriate salaries as well as adequate health care and living conditions for security personnel and their families.

Although budgets in poor countries are often skewed towards the military, the salaries of soldiers and other security personnel are often insufficient to meet their needs, leading personnel to supplement their incomes through alternative sources of employment (in some states the bulk of their income comes from freelance work for private employers or criminal activities).

Issues of pay and service conditions directly impact on the professionalism of security sector personnel and are frequently overlooked during the design of reform processes. Problems may be caused by misallocation of expenditure, often exacerbated by corruption, rather than the inadequacy of total budgets. The problems will usually have to be addressed in the context of wider reforms of public expenditure management.

*Security personnel are unlikely to operate in a professional way if their pay and conditions are inadequate...*

*...they should not have to moonlight...*

*...failure to tackle these problems will undermine reform.*

# Annex 1

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Contact information for UK Government departments and other organisations working on security sector reform.

## **Department for International Development**

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## **Ministry of Defence**

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Defence Advisory Team

Room 250 Wellington Hall

Royal Military College Of Science

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## **Foreign and Commonwealth Office**

Security Policy Department

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## **Non-governmental organisation**

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Fax: 020 7848 2748



## Annex 2

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- External Controls.
- Community Policing.
- Criminal Investigation.
- International Police Assistance.

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## **Department for International Development**

The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK government department responsible for promoting development and the reduction of poverty. The government first elected in 1997 has increased its commitment to development by strengthening the department and increasing its budget.

The central focus of the Government's policy, set out in the 1997 White Paper on International Development, is a commitment to the internationally agreed target to halve the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015, together with the associated targets including basic health care provision and universal access to primary education by the same date. The second White Paper on International Development, published in December 2000, reaffirmed this commitment, while focusing specifically on how to manage the process of globalisation to benefit poor people.

DFID seeks to work in partnership with governments which are committed to the international targets, and seeks to work with business, civil society and the research community to this end. We also work with multilateral institutions including the World Bank, United Nations agencies and the European Community. The bulk of our assistance is concentrated on the poorest countries in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. We are also contributing to poverty elimination and sustainable development in middle income countries in Latin America, the Caribbean and elsewhere. DFID is also helping the transition countries in central and eastern Europe to try to ensure that the process of change brings benefits to all people and particularly to the poorest.

As well as its headquarters in London and East Kilbride, DFID has offices in many developing countries. In others, DFID works through staff based in British embassies and high commissions.

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